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Interpretation of mixed agreements 
 
Panos Koutrakos* 
 
 
I. Introduction   
 
In relation to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to interpret mixed agreements, it 
has been argued that:  
 
‘[whilst] the case-law [is] copious, … successive developments, far from offering a 
smooth passage, have constructed a long and winding path, whose complex route 
demands certain adjustments in order to help its confused users find their way’.1  
 
This argument was made by Advocate General Colomer in his Opinion in Case C-
431/05 Merck. In the same Opinion, he refers to the ‘deficiencies’ of the relevant 
case-law as well as the latter’s ‘illogical’ consequences.2 
 
This Chapter will examine whether this statement is borne out by the case-law of the 
Court of Justice. The analysis is structured in thee parts. First, it will examine the 
origin of the Court’s approach to its jurisdiction. Second, it will set out the parameters 
of the wide construction of its jurisdiction in the contest of the preliminary reference 
procedure. Third, it will outline its approach as developed in the context of 
enforcement proceedings. Finally, it will analyse the above developments in the light 
of the more recent judgment in Case C-431/05 Merck. Throughout this analysis, the 
threads which bring together the different strands of the Court’s case-law and the 
quest for identifying the Community interest, as well as the methods which would 
serve it best, will be examined. 
 
II. The origin  
 
The question of the existence and the limits of the jurisdiction of the Community 
judiciary to interpret mixed agreements was not addressed by the Court until the mid 
1990s. The Court avoided the question of the scope of its jurisdiction to interpret 
mixed agreements in a number of cases. These included Haegeman in relation to the 
prohibition on customs duties set out in the Association Agreement with Greece,3 
Razanatsimba on the treatment of nationals and companies of the Member States and 
the African, Carribean and Pacific Group States under the First Lomé Convention,4 
and Sevince5 and Kus6 in relation to decisions of the Association Council established 
under the Association Agreement with Turkey on free movement of workers.  
 
                                                 
            *University of Bristol. 
1
 Case C-431/05 Merck Genéricos – Produtos Farmacêuticos Lda v Merck & Co. Inc., Merck Sharp & 
Dohme Ldª [2007] ECR I-7001, para. 33 of his Opinion. 
2
 Ibid, para. 60 and 59 respectively. 
3
 Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgium [1974] ECR 449. 
4
 Case 65/77 [1977] Razanatsimba ECR 2229. 
5
 Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatsecretaris van Justitie [1990] ECR I-3461. 
6
 Case C-237/91 Kus v Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden [1992] ECR I-6781. 
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 It is a testament to the ability of the Community legal order to adjust pragmatically to 
political realities that questions central to one of the most important aspects of its 
external relations should have been avoided for so long without undermining either 
the development of that system, or the capacity of the EC to comply with its 
international law obligations. In this respect, the approach of the Court of Justice was 
not dissimilar to that it followed in relation to the effects of World Trade 
Organisations rules under EC law.7  
 
The first time where the Court’s jurisdiction to interpret mixed agreements was 
challenged expressly was in Demirel.8 The German and United Kingdom 
Governments argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the 
interpretation of the provisions the Association Agreement with Turkey on free 
movement of workers. They argued that such issues fell within the exclusive 
competence of the Member States. The Court ruled that the latter was not the case: 9 
 
Since the agreement in question is an association agreement creating special, privileged links 
with a non-member country which must, at least to a certain extent, take part in the 
Community system, Article [310] must necessarily empower the Community to guarantee 
commitments towards non-member countries in all the fields covered by the Treaty. Since 
freedom of movement for workers is, by virtue of Article [39] et seq of the EEC Treaty, one 
of the fields covered by that Treaty, it follows that commitments regarding freedom of 
movement fall within the powers conferred on the Community by Article 238. Thus the 
question whether the Court has jurisdiction to rule ion the interpretation of a provision in a 
mixed agreement containing a commitment which only the member states could enter into in 
the sphere of their own powers does not arise.  
 
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be called in question by virtue of the fact 
that in the field of freedom of movement for workers, as Community law now stands, it is for 
the Member States to lay down the rules which are necessary to give effect in their territory to 
the provisions of the Agreement or the decisions to be adopted by the Association Council.  
 
As the Court held in … Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641, in 
ensuring respect for commitments arising from an agreement concluded by the Community 
institutions the Member States fulfil, within the Community system, an obligation in relation 
to the Community which has assumed responsibility for the due performance of the 
agreement. 
 
The above extract is interesting for three main reasons. First, it leaves open the 
question of the Court’s jurisdiction by focusing on the issue of competence. Second, it 
is confined to the argument put forward by the German and British Governments 
about the nature of the competence of Member States in the area and does not address 
at all the issue of the existence of such competence. Third, on the other hand, by 
referring to Kupferberg, a case about the tax provisions of the Free Trade Agreement 
with Portugal, the Court transposes its case-law on purely Community agreements to 
that of mixed agreement, and then relies upon it in order to stress the duty of Member 
                                                 
7
 See Case C-183/95 Affish [1997] ECR I-4315, Joined Cases C-364/95 and 365/95 T. Port GmbH & 
Co v Hauptzollampt Hamburg-Jonas [1998] ECR I-1023, Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT 
Marketing [1998] ECR I-3603. 
8
 Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwabisch Gnuend [1987] ECR 1545. 
9
 Paras 9-11. 
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States towards the Community to ensure respect for commitments assumed by the 
latter.10   
 
III. The principle  
 
Subsequent case-law addressed the question of the Court’s jurisdiction and its scope 
in a more direct way. In Case C-53/96 Hermès,11 the Court received a preliminary 
reference from the Netherlands about the interpretation of Article 50(6) of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). This 
rule is about the enforcement of trademarks by means of provisional measures and 
provides that, upon request by the defendant, such measures shall be revoked or 
otherwise cease to have effect, if proceedings leading to a decision on the merits of 
the case are not initiated within a reasonable period. The duration of the latter is to be 
determined by the judicial authority ordering the measures or, in the absence of such a 
determination, it should not to exceed 20 working days or 31 calendar days, 
whichever is the longer. 
 
Three Governments intervened and challenged the Court’s jurisdiction.12 They argued 
that the rule in question fell beyond the Community’s competence, as the Court had 
ruled in Opinion 1/94 that the Community was not exclusively competent to conclude 
TRIPs because, amongst other reasons, no general common rules on protection of 
intellectual property rights had been adopted.13   
 
An interesting feature of this case was that the subject-matter of the action before the 
referring court was a national, rather than a Community, trademark.  However, this 
did not prevent the Court from concluding that it the interpretation of Article 50(6) 
TRIPs in that case fell within the scope of its jurisdiction. This conclusion was 
substantiated on the basis of a number of interrelated factors. First, the Court referred 
to the absence of any reference in the EC Decision concluding the WTO Agreements 
to the division of competence between the Community and the Member States.14  
Second, it pointed out that the TRIPs provision which it had been asked to interpret 
was of a procedural nature and would be applicable to Community trademarks, the 
relevant EC instrument having been adopted a month prior to the signing of the WTO 
Agreement by the Community.15 After all, Article 99 of Regulation 40/94 provides for 
the adoption of provisional measures for the protection of the Community trademark. 
The Court then ruled that,16  
 
                                                 
10
 On the implications of the judgment, see amongst others A.F. Gagliardi, ‘The Right of Individuals to 
Invole the Provisions of Mixed Agreements before the National Courts: A New Message from 
Luxembourg?,’ (24 ELRev 276 at 286, C. Kaddous, Le droit des relations extérieures dans la 
jurisprudence de la Cour de de justice des Communauts européennes (Helbing & Lichtenhahn 1998) 
76-78, A. Rosas, ‘Mixed Union – Mixed Agreements’ in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.), International Law 
Aspects of the European Union (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998) 125 at 140-1. 
11
 Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing [1998] ECR I-3603. 
12
 These were the French, the Netherlands and the UK Governments.  
13
 Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5267 at para. 104 where reference was made, exceptionally, to Council 
Reg. 3842/86 laying down measures to prohibit the release for free circulation of counterfeit goods 
‘1986] OJ L 357/1. 
14
 Council Dec. 94/800 [1994] OJ L 336/1. 
15
 Council Reg. 40/94 on the Community trade mark [1994] OJ L 11/1. 
16
 Paras 28-29.  
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…since the Community is a party to the TRIPs Agreement and since that agreement applies to 
the Community trade mark, the courts referred to in Article 99 of Regulation No 40/94, when 
called upon to apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional measures for the 
protection of rights arising under a Community trade mark, are required to do so, as far as 
possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of Article 50 of the TRIPs Agreement  
 
It follows that the Court has, in any event, jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of the TRIPs 
Agreement. 
 
The national nature of the subject matter of the dispute before the referring court, that 
is a trademark protected under the Netherlands law, was dismissed as immaterial on 
the basis of the autonomy of national courts to determine the questions referred to the 
Court of Justice under Article 234 EC, as well as the Community interest: in relation 
to the latter, it was pointed out that,17 
 
… where a provision can apply both to situations falling within the scope of national law and 
to situations falling within the scope of Community law, it is clearly in the Community 
interest that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, that provision should be 
interpreted uniformly, whatever the circumstances in which it is to apply...  
 
Whilst the judgment in Hermès construed the jurisdiction of the Court to interpret 
mixed agreements in broad terms, it was not clear quite how broad this was.18 After 
all, there were a number of features in Hermès which rendered its legal and factual 
context quite specific: not only had the Community adopted legislation within the area 
covered by the provision of the agreement in question prior to the signing of the latter, 
but that provision was also of a procedural nature which could apply to the relevant 
Community measure in the future, and the conclusion of the agreement was not 
accompanied by an allocation of the Community’s competence and that of its Member 
States. In the absence of any of these features, would the jurisdiction of the Court be 
maintained? And even if all these features were present, would any variation affect its 
scope? For instance, would the Court’s jurisdiction exist even in the presence of a 
Community measure which, whilst within the scope of the relevant provision of the 
mixed agreement broadly understood, covered a subject-matter distinct from that in 
the case referred under Article 234 EC? Would it exist if there was no secondary 
measure at the time of the reference, but the adoption of a legislative proposal was 
pending?19 And what if the provision of a mixed agreement falls within the exclusive 
competence of the Member States? 
 
                                                 
17
 Para. 32. 
18
 See A. von Bogdandy, casenote on Case C-53/96 Hermès, (1999) 36 CMLRev 663, A. Dashwood, 
‘Preliminary Rulings on the Interrpetation of Mixed Agreements’ in D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), 
Judicial Review in European Union Law – Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley Vol 1 
(The Hague: Kluwer, 2000) 167, J. Heliskoski, ‘The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice to 
Give Preliminary Rulings on the Interpretation of Mixed Agreements’, (2000) 69 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 395 
19
 In his Opinion in Joined Cases 300/98 and 392/98 Parfums Christian Dior  [2000] ECR I-11307, AG 
Cosmas argued that, ‘in the context of Article [234] of the Treaty, to extend the Court's interpretative 
jurisdiction to TRIPs provisions relating to areas in which the (potential) Community competence has 
not yet been exercised would constitute pursuit of a policy of judge-made law in conflict with the 
constitutional logic of the Treaty and would be difficult to justify on grounds of expediency’ (para. 51). 
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The subsequent case-law sought to shed some light on this. In Joined Cases C-300/98 
and 392/98 Parfums Christian Dior,20 the Court of Justice dealt with two references 
from The Netherlands (one from the Hoge Raad) about, again, Article 50 TRIPs and 
its application to trademarks and industrial designs disputes. In relation to the latter 
area, the Community had not adopted any secondary measure. One of the questions 
referred from the Hoge Raad was precisely whether the jurisdiction of the Court to 
interpret Article 50 TRIPs also extended to its provisions in cases where no 
trademarks were involved.   
 
The starting point for the judgment was the articulation of the Court’s jurisdiction in 
broad terms:21  
 
‘TRIPs … was concluded by the Community and its Member States under joint competence 
… It follows that where a case is brought before the Court in accordance with the provisions 
of the Treaty, in particular Article [234] thereof, the Court has jurisdiction to define the 
obligations which the Community has thereby assumed and, for that purpose, to interpret 
TRIPs’.  
 
What is noticeable about this extract is the absence of any reference to the existence 
of secondary Community rules. In fact, the judgment reads as if Hermès was merely 
an example where the Court’s jurisdiction would be exercised. Indeed, the Court goes 
on to point out that ‘in particular, the Court has jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 
TRIPs in order to meet the needs of the courts of the Member States when they are 
called upon to apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional measures for 
the protection of rights arising under Community legislation falling within the scope 
of TRIPs’.22  
 
It then held as follows:  
 
37. Since Article 50 of TRIPs constitutes a procedural provision which should be applied in 
the same way in every situation falling within its scope and is capable of applying both to 
situations covered by national law and to situations covered by Community law, that 
obligation requires the judicial bodies of the Member States and the Community, for practical 
and legal reasons, to give it a uniform interpretation.  
 
38. Only the Court of Justice acting in cooperation with the courts and tribunals of the 
Member States pursuant to Article [234] of the Treaty is in a position to ensure such uniform 
interpretation.  
 
39. The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to interpret Article 50 of TRIPs is thus not 
restricted solely to situations covered by trade-mark law. 
 
The ruling in Dior and Others not only confirms the broad scope of the Court’s 
jurisdiction, but it also anchors it even more firmly to the need for uniformity of 
interpretation. This is the thread which links this judgment with Hermès where, it is 
                                                 
20
 Joined Cases 300/98 and 392/98 Parfums Christian Dior [2000] ECR I-11307. 
21
 Para. 33. 
22
 Para. 34 (emphasis added). It goes on to point out that ‘likewise, where a provision such as Article 50 
of TRIPs can apply both to situations falling within the scope of national law and to situations falling 
within that of Community law, as is the case in the field of trade marks, the Court has jurisdiction to 
interpret it in order to forestall future differences of interpretation’ (para. 35).  
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recalled, reference was also made to the Community interest. However, whilst there 
was no doubt left as to the wide scope of its jurisdiction, the Court also makes it clear 
that that scope is not without limits. In fact, it holds that it is for the national courts to 
decide whether Article 50 of TRIPs grants rights to individuals upon which they may 
rely before national courts in areas where the Community ‘has not yet legislated and 
which consequently falls within the competence of the Member States’;23 if, on the 
other hand, the Community has already legislated in a field to which TRIPs applies, 
then the national courts must follow the Court’s case-law on the effects of WTO rules 
following the Portuguese Textiles judgment24 and interpret national law as far as 
possible in the light of the wording and purpose of Article 50 of TRIPs.25  
 
The role of national courts was even more pronounced in the judgment in Case C-
89/99 Schieving-Nijstad, where the Court set out a number of specific issues 
regarding the interpretation of Article 50(6) TRIPs which they had to ascertain.26  
However, the delineation of Community and national competence is an exercise 
which national courts are bound to find fraught with problems. This is illustrated in 
Case C-431/05 Merck, where the referring court argued that it was for the Court of 
Justice to determine whether Article 33 TRIPs could be invoked by individuals before 
national courts, whereas the Court concluded that that was, in fact, a task for national 
courts.27  
 
There are two further issues which the case-law examined in this section raises. The 
first is about the requirement of uniform interpretation which gives rise to the Court’s 
jurisdiction to determine the effect of a provision of a mixed agreement in situations 
concerning national law.28 The ruling in Hermès, as well as those in Dior and Others 
and Schieving-Nijstad, are about a procedural provisions of TRIPs, capable of 
applying both to situations covered by national law and to situations covered by 
Community law; it is this characteristic which, according to the Court, gives rise to 
the requirement of uniform interpretation and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Justice in the context of the preliminary reference procedure. However, this does 
not necessarily follow: uniform interpretation is a requirement which should govern 
the application of Community law, and any discrepancy between the latter and 
national law governing situations beyond the scope of Community law is not 
necessarily problematic. After all, provisions of domestic law are relevant in terms of 
their compatibility with Community law only in cases with an intra-Community 
element. The cases to which the Court refers in order to substantiate its line of 
reasoning do not necessarily support its conclusion either:29 it is one thing for a 
Member State to adopt a solution of Community law within its domestic legal order 
and then to make a reference to the Court of Justice as to its interpretation, and quite 
                                                 
23
 Para. 48.  
24
 Case C-140/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR I-8395.  
25
 Para. 47. 
26
 Case C-89/99 Schieving-Nijstad vof and Others and Robert Groeneveled [2001] ECR I-5851. 
27
 See the analysis below.  
28
 In his Opinion in Case C-89/99 Schieving-Nijstad vof and Others and Robert Groeneveled [2001] 
ECR I-5851, AG Jacobs pointed out that ‘it is not easy to understand why Community law governs the 
effects of Article 50 of the TRIPs Agreement not only where a Community trade mark is involved but 
also in situations concerning national trade marks’ (para. 40).  
29
 In Hermès (para. 32), reference is made to Case C-130/95 Giloy v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-
OSt [1997] ECR I-4291, para. 28, and Case C-28/95 Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der 
Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen [1997] ECR I-4161, para. 34.    
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another for the Court to hold that the existence of Community law, even if not 
applicable in the case before it, would bring the dispute within its jurisdiction.   
 
The second issue raised by the above line of cases is the conclusion about the 
determination of direct effect of provisions set out in TRIPs. This does not necessarily 
follow from either the preceding line of reasoning set out in the Dior judgment or the 
logic of interpretation. The conclusion about direct effect presupposes a distinction 
between interpretation and effect of the provision of a mixed agreement. However, the 
effect of such a provision, and in particular whether it may be invoked before national 
courts, is in itself a matter of interpretation. Quite what it is that should make direct 
effect prevail over the requirement of uniform interpretation is not clear, all the more 
so in the light of the central position of the latter in the construction of the Court;s 
jurisdiction in broad terms.   
 
IV. Jurisdiction to interpret mixed agreements in the context of Article 226 EC  
 
The issue of the interpretation of mixed agreements and the scope of the Court’s 
jurisdiction has also arisen in a number of enforcement actions brought by the 
Commission under Article 226 EC.  
 
In the Berne Convention case,30 the problem was the failure by Ireland to update its 
copyright law and ratify the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Work in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol 28 of the European Economic 
Area (EEA) Agreement. The United Kingdom Government intervened and challenged 
the jurisdiction of the Court on the basis of the mixed character of the EEA 
Agreement. In particular, it argued that only matters in relation to which the 
Community had adopted harmonising measures could be subject to the Court’s 
review. Therefore, it alleged that the Berne Convention was  a matter of international 
law, it fell within national competence and its application was excluded from the 
scope of the Court’s jurisdiction.  
 
This objection was dismissed as inadmissible, because no such argument was 
advanced by the defending party, that is Ireland.31 In its judgment, the Court 
assimilated mixed agreements to purely Community agreements. It did so by relying 
upon previous pronouncements made in the context of association agreements in 
Demirel.32 It, then, went on to conclude that the Berne Convention falls ‘in large 
measure’ within the scope of EC competence. It is interesting that this statement is 
substantiated in only one paragraph, with reference to a handful of related areas in 
which the EC has legislated and with no reference to specific secondary measures and 
no attempt to define the extent to which the mixed character of the Convention might 
affect the nature of the Community duty imposed on the Member States. Indeed, the 
Court’s assessment of the extent to which there is coincidence between the subject-
matter of the Convention and EC law is confined to affirmative statements ‘in large 
measure’ and ‘to a very great extent’.33  
 
                                                 
30
 Case C-13/00 Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I-2943. 
31
 See Art. 37 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice.  
32
 nX above, para. 9. 
33
 Paras 16 and 17 respectively.  
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This broad brush approach is not only bold in its implications, but also regrettable in 
its lack of clarity and the generalizations which it appears to introduce. Quite apart 
from the way in which references to secondary measures are made, the Court’s 
reading of the extract from Demirel in order to assimilate mixed agreements to purely 
Community agreements appears rather strained. Be that as it may, this approach may 
be understood in the light of the specific circumstances of the action. On the one 
hand, the Irish Government had accepted the existence of the violation and had made 
it clear that national law acceding to the Convention had been at an advanced stage of 
scrutiny before the Irish Parliament. On the other hand, more crucially, the action was 
about adherence: as the convention was indivisible, the failure of a Member State to 
accede to it is clearly problematic in so far as it prevents the Community from 
adhering to it. However, this argument, whilst put forward by Advocate General   
Mischo,34 was ignored by the Court.  
 
An equally broad approach was adopted in the subsequent judgment in Etang de 
Berre.35 France had not adopted measures to prevent, abate and combat heavy and 
prolonged pollution of a saltwater march named Étang de Berre, a failure which the 
Commission alleged to constitute a violation of the Convention for the Protection of 
the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution. The objection to the Court’s jurisdiction put 
forward by the French Government was dismissed. Delivering the judgment without 
a submission from an Advocate General,36 the Court referred verbatim to the 
judgment in Berne Convention. Again, the subject matter of the Convention was 
deemed ‘without doubt [to] cover a field which falls in large measure within 
Community competence’.37 This is substantiated by a very general statement about 
environmental protection and how it is ‘in very large measure regulated by 
Community legislation, including with regard to the protection of waters against 
pollution’, with references to measures concerning urban waste-water treatment, the 
protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources, 
the establishment of a framework for Community action in the field of water policy38. 
The Court went on to conclude as follows:   
 
‘Since the Convention and the Protocol thus create rights and obligations in a field covered in 
large measure by Community legislation, there is a Community interest in compliance by 
both the Community and its Member States with the commitments entered into under those 
instruments’. 
 
It is noteworthy that the Court should refrain from addressing a specific issue raised 
by the French Government, according to which there was no Community law 
regarding discharges of fresh water and alluvia into the marine environment, that is 
the specific obligations which France was alleged to have violated. Instead, this fact 
is not disputed by the Court which merely pointed out that it ‘is not capable of calling 
that finding [that is the existence of the Community interest] into question’.39 
                                                 
34
 Para. 50 of his Opinion. This argument was also made by AG Maduro in Case C-459/03 Commission 
v Ireland (re: Mox Plant) [2006] ECR I-4635, para. 30. 
35
 Case C-239/03 Commission v France [2004] ECR I-9325 
36
 In accordance with Art. 20 subpara. 5 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, ‘[w]here it considers that 
the case raises no new point of law, the Court may decide, after hearing the Advocate General, that the 
case shall be determined without a submission from the Advocate General’. 
37
 Para. 27 
38
 Para. 28.;  
39
 Para. 30 
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However, there seems to be a leap between the question which the Court set out to 
answer in order to define its jurisdiction and the one which it ended up answering: the 
former is whether the subject-matter of the mixed agreement in question falls within 
the scope of EC law; the latter is whether the subject-matter of the agreement is 
covered by EC legislation. This latter question is narrower: in the presence of 
secondary legislation, there can be no doubt that the subject-matter of the agreement 
would fall within the scope of EC law. The question which remains is whether the 
conclusion would have been different in the absence of Community legislation. 
 
The most recent episode in this line of enforcement actions where the jurisdiction of 
the Court was in issue was the Mox Plant case.40 The subject-matter of these 
enforcement proceedings was the initiation by Ireland of proceedings against the 
United Kingdom in the context of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), a convention to which both the Community and the Member States 
are parties. In particular, Ireland had objected to the construction of Mox plant, a 
facility designed to recycle plutonium from spent nuclear fuel, at Sellafield and 
argued that the British Government violated substantive provisions set out in 
UNCLOS regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment, as 
well as authorization and notification procedures. The Commission, on the other 
hand, viewed the initiation of proceedings by Ireland against another Member State 
beyond the Community legal framework as a violation of the duty of cooperation 
under Article 10 EC and the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under 
Article 292 EC.  
 
In the vein of the argument by the French Government in Etang de Berre, the Irish 
Government argued that no EC legislation at all existed in relation to the discharge of 
radioactive substances into the marine environment and notification and cooperation 
in the area of the transport of such substances by sea. In addition, it argued that no 
secondary EC rules featured any rule comparable to that laid down in the 
Convention. 
 
The starting point for the judgment is the examination of whether the UNCLOS 
provisions relied upon by Ireland fall within the scope of EC competence. The 
judgment is underpinned by a clear emphasis on the existence of EC competence, 
rather than its nature: the Court points out that ‘the question as to whether a provision 
of a mixed agreement comes within the competence of the Community is one which 
relates to the attribution and, thus, the very existence of that competence, and not to 
its exclusive or shared nature’.41 The implications are clear:42  
 
… the existence of the Community’s external competence in regard to protection of the 
marine environment is not, in principle, contingent on the adoption of measures of secondary 
law covering the area in question and liable to be affected if Member States were to take part 
in the procedure for concluding the agreement in question, within the terms of the principle 
formulated by the Court in paragraph 17 of the AETR judgment. 
 
                                                 
40
 Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635 
41
 Para. 93. 
42
 Paras 94-5. 
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The Community can enter into agreements in the area of environmental protection even if the 
specific matters covered by those agreements are not yet, or are only very partially, the 
subject of rules at Community level, which, by reason of that fact, are not likely to be affected 
 
The Court, then, sets out to ascertain whether, by concluding UNCLOS, the 
Community chose to exercise its non-exclusive competence in the area of marine 
conservation. In doing so, it refers to two sources, namely the legal basis of the 
Council Decision concluding UNCLOs on behalf of the Community,43 that is Article 
130s(1) EC, and the Declaration of Competence submitted by the Community to 
UNCLOS and annexed to Council Decision 98/392. This states that the prevention of 
marine pollution falls within the Community’s exclusive competence only to the 
extent that such provisions of UNCLOS or implementing legal instruments affect 
common rules established by the Community; however, when Community rules exist 
but are not affected, for instance in cases of minimum standards rules, the Member 
States have competence without prejudice to the Community’s competence to act in 
this field.  
 
On the basis of the above, the Court points out that44  
 
It follows that, within the specific context of the Convention, a finding that there has been a 
transfer to the Community of areas of shared competence is contingent on the existence of 
Community rules within the areas covered by the Convention provisions in issue, irrespective 
of what may otherwise be the scope and nature of those rules.  
 
The Court, then, goes further and looks at the appendix to the Declaration setting out 
the Community acts which refer to matters governed by UNCLOS and which the 
Court views as ‘a useful reference base’.45 With references to Directive 85/337 on 
environmental assessment,46 Directive 93/75 on minimum requirements for vessels 
carrying dangerous or polluting goods,47 and Directive 90/313 on the freedom of 
access to information about the environment,48 the Court concludes that49  
 
the matters covered by the provisions of the Convention relied on by Ireland before the 
Arbitral Tribunal are very largely regulated by Community measures, several of which are 
mentioned expressly in the appendix to [the] declaration [of Community competence attached 
thereto].   
 
Using a different formulation, this is reaffirmed further down in the judgment by a 
statement that the UNCLOS provisions relied upon by Ireland, ‘which clearly cover a 
significant part of the dispute relating to the MOX plant, come within the scope of 
Community competence which the Community has elected to exercise by becoming a 
party to the Convention’.50  
 
                                                 
43
 Council Dec. 98/392 [1998] OJ L 179/1. 
44
 Para. 108. 
45
 Para. 109. 
46
 [1985] OJ L 175/40. 
47
 [1993] OJ L 247/19. 
48
 [1990] OJ L 158/56. 
49
 Para. 110. 
50
 Para. 120. 
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The Mox Plant case has attracted considerable attention.51 For the purposes of this 
analysis, it is worth pointing out that the specific legal and factual framework of this 
case may explain the conclusion reached by the Court: on the one hand, there was a 
Declaration of Competence which referred to specific EC measures the interpretation 
of which the Irish Government invoked before the UNCLOS bodies; on the other 
hand, Article 282 UNCLOS expressly enables the parties to deviate from compliance 
with the enforcement procedures set out in UNCLOS and, instead, to submit a dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention to a procedure set out 
in a general, regional or bilateral agreement that entails a binding decision.  
However, the line of reasoning followed by the Court raises two issues. First, the 
emphasis on whether the Community had elected to exercise its competence when it 
concluded UNCLOS is problematic. There are three main reasons for this. First, it 
conflates the position of the Community and the Member States towards the third 
parties regarding the implementation of, and the ensuing responsibility under, the 
UNCLOS rules with the integrity of the Community legal order and the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice – the former is external, whereas the latter is 
internal to the Community legal order. Put differently, whether the Community has 
exercised its non-exclusive competence under the UNCLOS provisions is a question 
which is narrower to whether Ireland violated its EC Treaty obligations by submitting 
a dispute against another Member State beyond the EC legal framework.52 After all, a 
Member State is under a duty not to violate Community law even in areas which fall 
within the sphere of their competence. This is the case in relation to areas of activity 
as diverse as foreign policy,53 the organization of the armed forces,54 the organization 
of national health care systems,55 and criminal law.56 
The second reason which makes the emphasis on the exercise of the Community 
competence in Mox Plant problematic is that it appears to be at odds with the 
substance of the judgment. Indeed, the existence of Community legislation, which the 
Court deems indicative of the exercise of the Community’s competence, in fact 
suggests that the dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom falls within the 
scope of Community law. It is puzzling that the Court should choose to view the 
matter from this angle, when the facts of the case, and in particular the reliance upon 
EC secondary measures by the Irish Government before the UNCLOS tribunal, made 
                                                 
51
 See M. Bronckers, ‘The relationship of the EC Court with Other International Tribunals: Non-
Commital, Respectful or Submissive?’, (2007) 44 CMLRev 601, R. Churchill and J. Scott, ‘The MOx 
Plant Litigation: The First Half-Life’, (2004) 53 ICLQ 643, N. Lavranos, ‘The scope of the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice’, (2007) 32 ELRev 83, N., Lavranos, ‘The MOX Plant and Jzeren 
Rijn Disputes: Which Court Is the Supreme Arbiter?’, (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 
249. 
52
 In this vein, see M Cremona, ‘Defending the Community Interest: the Duties of Cooperation and 
Compliance’ in M. Cremona and B. De Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law – Constitutional 
Fundamentals (Hart Publishing 2008) 125 at 150-2. 
53
 Case C-125/95 The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com / HM Treasury and Bank of England [1997] ECR I-
81 at para.27. 
54
 Case C-273/97 Sirdar [1999] ECR I-7403, Case C-285/98 Kreil [2000] ECR I-69, Case C-186/01 
Dory [2003] ECR I-2479. For a comment, see P. Koutrakos, ‘How far is far enough? EC law and the 
organisation of the armed forces after Dory’, (2003) 66 MLR 759 and M. Trybus, European Union 
Law and Defence Integration (Hart Publishing 2005) Ch. 9.    
55
 Case C-120/95 Decker  v Caisse de maladie des employés privés [1998] ECR I-1831, Case C-158/96 
Kohll  v Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-1931, Case C-372/04 Watts [2006] I-4325. 
56
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it very clear that what was at stake was the scope of EC law. Therefore, there appears 
to be a disjunction between the question which the judgment sets out to address, and 
which it views as central to the dispute upon which it is called to adjudicate, and the 
method pursuant to which it chose to address it, as well as the conclusion to which 
this led.   
A third problem is raised by the heavy reliance in the judgment upon the declaration 
of competence. Whilst their objective is to enable the Community’s partners to clarify 
issues of delineation of competence between the Community and the Member States, 
and, consequently, issues of responsibility, declarations of competence may be quite 
unhelpful. In his Opinion in Mox Plant, Advocate General Maduro refers to the ‘lack 
of clarity and elegance’ which characterizes the declaration attached to UNCLOS.57 In 
fact, declarations of competence may prove to be a distinctly unreliable yardstick not 
only for third parties but also Member States seeking guidance as to how to exercise 
their international law rights and comply with their relevant duties in accordance with 
their Community law obligations.58 These include statements aiming to outline in 
general terms the state of the law regarding the existence and nature of Community 
competence, as well as to convey the dynamic and incremental nature of that 
competence59 - considering that the principles underpinning the scope, effects, and 
implications of the existence and exercise of EC competence are still a long way from 
being settled, it is quite a challenge to expect the third parties to which they are 
addressed to be able to navigate their way through the Community’s declarations of 
competence.   
 
V. The more recent twist  
 
The latest episode in the saga examined in this Chapter is marked by the judgment 
which the Grand Chamber delivered in Case C-431/05 Merck Genéricos in September 
2007.60 This reference from the Portuguese Supreme Court was about the effect of 
Article 33 TRIPs which provides that patents are protected for a minimum period of 
20 years from the filing date. Whilst the Portuguese Industrial Property Code, as 
amended in June 1995, provided for a 20-year period of protection, it also stipulated 
that patents filed before the entry into force of that provision were protected for 15 
years, a period stipulated under prior law.  
 
The claimant in the main proceedings sold a pharmaceutical product under the trade 
mark ‘Enalapril Merck’. This was claimed to be the same as a product under the trade 
mark ‘Renitec’ and was sold at considerably lower prices. The patent holder of the 
latter product brought an action against Merck Genéricos arguing that selling their 
product without an authorization constituted a violation of their patent right. Whilst 
                                                 
57
 Para. 30 of his Opinion.  
58
 B. De Witte, ‘Too much constitutional law in the European Union’s Foreign Relations?’ in M. 
Cremona and B. De Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law – Constitutional Fundamentals (Hart 
Publishing 2008) 3 at 14-5 and P Koutrakos, ‘Legal Basis and Delimitation of Competence in EU 
External Relations’ in ibid, 171 at 183. 
59
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the Hague Conference on Private International Law set out in Annex II to Council Dec. 2006/719/EC 
[2006] OJ L 297/1 at 5, and the one submitted in matters covered by the Convention establishing a 
Customs Cooperation Council  annexed to Council Dec. 2007/668/EC [2007] OJ L 274/11 at 13-4. 
60
 Case C-431/05 Merck Genéricos – Produtos Farmacêuticos Lda v Merck & Co. Inc., Merck Sharp & 
Dohme Ldª [2007] ECR I-7001. 
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Merck Genéricos argued that the patent protection had expired in the light of the 
expiration of the 15-year period set out in Portuguese law for patents issued before 
June 1995, the patent holders counterargued that that provision was contrary to 
Article 33 TRIPs and that their patent was protected under the 20-year minimum rule 
set out therein.  
 
The latter claim was accepted by the Court of Appear but was further challenged by 
Merck Genéricos before the Supreme Court, arguing that Article 33 TRIPs could not 
have direct effect. The referring court asked two questions: does the ECJ have 
jurisdiction to interpret Article 33 TRIPs? If it does, may this provision be invoked in 
disputes between individuals before national courts, either on their own initiative or at 
the request of one of the parties? 
 
In its reference, the Portuguese Supreme Court took the view that the interpretation of 
Article 33 TRIPS fell beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. This 
was because a number of Community measures existed in the area of patents, namely 
regarding the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal 
products,61 the Community plant variety rights,62 and the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions.63 However, it did accept that the above measures only 
covered certain limited areas of patent law and, therefore, the point required 
clarification by the Court of Justice.  
 
Having summarized the development of the case-law by references to the binding 
effect of agreements concluded by the Community under Article 300(7) EC, the status 
of the WTO Agreement as an integral part of the Community legal order, the ensuing 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to interpret its provisions, and the absence of any 
allocation of competence between the Community and the Member States, the Court 
held that64 
 
It follows that, the TRIPS Agreement having been concluded by the Community and its 
Member States by virtue of joint competence, the Court, hearing a case brought before it in 
accordance with the provisions of the EC Treaty, in particular Article 234 EC, has jurisdiction 
to define the obligations which the Community ahs thereby assumed and, for that purpose, to 
interpret the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
It, then, focused on the question of direct effect and reaffirmed the Dior and Others 
dictum that Community law requires that TRIPS not be granted direct effect only in a 
field in which the Community has legislated, in which case national courts would only 
be required to interpret national law consistently with TRIPs as far as possible. 
Therefore, what became central was the question whether there is Community 
legislation in the area of patents. This is answered by what must be one of the shortest 
paragraphs to be found in a judgment delivered by the Court of Justice:65  
 
‘As Community law now stands, there is none’. 
 
                                                 
61
 Council Reg. 1768/92 [1992] OJ L 182/1. 
62
 Council Reg. 2100/92 [1992] OJ L 227/1. 
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 Dir. 98/44/EC [1998] OJ L 213/13.  
64
 Para. 33.  
65
 Para. 40.  
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This conclusion is substantiated by the very limited scope of the existing Community 
measures: the only one in the field of patents itself, namely Directive 98/44, deals 
with the specific isolated case of biotechnological invention; Regulation 2100/94 on 
plant varieties sets up a system which is distinct from patent law (as, for instance, it 
provides for much longer terms of protection); Regulation 1768/92 and Regulation 
1610/9666 have a secondary function as they aim to compensate for the period which 
may elapse between the filing of a patent application and the granting of authorization 
to place the relevant product on the market. This assessment leads the Court to repeat 
the above statement, albeit in a rather qualified manner:67 
 
The fact is that the Community has not yet exercised its powers in the sphere of patents or 
that, at the very least, at internal level, that exercise has not to date been of sufficient 
importance to lead to the conclusion that, as matters now stand, that sphere falls within the 
scope of Community law.  
 
The line of reasoning followed in the judgment is problematic on a number of 
grounds. In relation to the assessment of Community rules necessary in order to 
establish the Court’s jurisdiction to rule on direct effect, one is left puzzled as to the 
required criteria which the scope and intensity of such rules would need to meet. 
What is it that would make them ‘of sufficient importance’ to render direct effect a 
matter of Community law? What are, as Advocate General Colomer put it, ‘the 
parameters that would make it possible to ascertain the level of legislative activity 
sufficient to establish the competence of the community and therefore of the Court of 
Justice’?68 This does not become clear in the judgment. Instead, it is as if one were to 
guess, almost intuitively, whether secondary measures amount to a sufficient body of 
law as to justify the existence of EC competence. In another area of external relations, 
that of exclusive implied competence, it took us more than twenty years to understand 
what ‘common rules’ meant in the context of the AETR judgment,69 and the relevant 
principles still evolve. It would be regrettable if it took as long to determine the 
degree of EC legislative necessary activity to give rise to EC competence.   
 
Another problem has to do with the intensity with which the Court is prepared to 
carry out its examination of the existing secondary legislation. There is a distinct shift 
between the judgment in Etang de Berre and that in Merck: in the former, the Court 
referred generally to environmental legislation and held that the absence of specific 
measures dealing with the specific subject-matter of the mixed agreement in question 
was irrelevant; in Merck, the Court examined the substance of the existing measures, 
only to conclude that they were not ‘of sufficient importance’ to give rise to 
Community competence. In a similar vein, whilst acknowledging that the existing 
patent measures were not sufficient to substantiate jurisdiction, Advocate General 
Colomer suggested in his Opinion the possibility of a broader test: should patent law 
be viewed as part of the broader area of intellectual property law, the Court would 
have jurisdiction to interpret the effects of Article 33 TRIPs. This suggestion echoes 
                                                 
66
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69
 See Opinion 2/91 (Re: Convention No 170 ILO on safety in the use of chemicals at work) [1993] 
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the above approach adopted in Etang de Berre with which, however, the judgment in  
Merck sits uncomfortably.  
 
It is also interesting, in this respect, that the Court should have made no reference to 
four legislative proposals pending at the time; these included measures on compulsory 
licensing of patents relating to pharmaceutical products for export to countries with 
public health problems,70 the Community patent,71 the conferment of jurisdiction on 
the Court of Justice in disputes relating to the Community patent,72 and the 
establishment of the Community Patent Court and concerning appeals before the 
Court of First Instance.73 The problems associated with basing competence on the 
above measures notwithstanding,74 it is curious that they should have been ignored 
even as indicative of an incrementally developed legislative activity in the area.   
 
In relation to the link between the judgment in Merck and prior case-law, it has been 
argued that the former expands the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction considerably and 
unduly.75 This argument is based on the wording of paragraph 31 of the judgment 
where it is pointed out that, following its conclusion by the Community, ‘according to 
settled case-law, the provisions of that convention now form an integral part of the 
Community legal order… [w]ithin the framework [of which] the Court has 
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of that 
agreement’. In particular, it is pointed out that, contrary to previous case-law, this 
statement does not qualify the status of the mixed agreement, and consequently the 
jurisdiction of the Court, with reference to the scope of the Community’s 
competence.76 However, it is suggested that the implications of the formulation of this 
statement should not be exaggerated. On the one hand, it is difficult to see quite how 
the Court could justify its jurisdiction to interpret a provision of a mixed agreement 
falling within the exclusive competence of the Member States. On the other hand, the 
Court’ approach in all the judgments examined in this Chapter (in fact, most of the 
judgments delivered in the area of EU external relations in general) is characterized 
by distinct reluctance to rule on issues not raised in the dispute before it and articulate 
general pronouncements. It would be inexplicable if this approach was changed in 
Merck in such an unobtrusive manner with such profound implications.  
 
The questions raised by the approach of the Court, even prior to the judgment in 
Merck, and the ensuing lack of clarity were addressed by Advocate General Colomer 
in his Opinion in the latter judgment. He put forward an alternative approach, based 
on the unlimited jurisdiction of the Court to interpret TRIPs. He substantiated this 
view on a number of grounds:77 the need for the Community to accommodate the 
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‘constitutional’ framework set out by the WTO Agreements by rendering it part of the 
Community legal order and ensuring the Community’s compliance with their 
provisions; the requirement that the duty of cooperation set out in Article 10 EC be 
understood as binding the Community and the Member States in the implementation 
of WTO agreements in good faith and ensuring their effectiveness; the need to 
interpret TRIPs in a uniform manner. The Advocate General points out that the 
unlimited jurisdiction of the Court would not entail any transfer of competence to the 
Community: ‘on the contrary, if there were uniform interpretation, binding o 
everybody, even in the fields in which there is as yet no Community legislation, the 
Member States could more easily comply with the provisions of Article 10 EC, 
making use of [legislative] powers’.78 
 
Furthermore, Advocate General Colomer suggests that his approach is necessitated by 
the current state of the law which he attacks in quite strong terms: ‘the Court of 
Justice ought to be aware of the deficiencies in its case-law and try to resolve the 
constant unease regarding its power to examine mixed agreements, by daring to 
change course and to assume its responsibility, in order both to reformulate its case-
law and adapt it to the fundamental principles of international law, and to invest it 
with the legal certainty required by institutions at intra-Community level’.79 
 
This approach has two interrelated advantages: on the one hand, it is clear and easy to 
apply and, on the other hand, it would enable the Court to respond to the increasing 
regularity of disputes regarding the interpretation of mixed agreements. Advocate 
General Colomer pointed out that, ‘[w]ith the gradual increase in shared competence 
in the many and varied fields which are “communitised”, it is predicted that an 
avalanche of questions will fall on the Court of Justice, requiring it to rule on its 
jurisdiction in the matter, and it will not always be able to avoid examining the 
relevant Community legislation’.80  
 
However, and with the utmost respect, whilst addressing the shortcomings of the 
current position, the approach suggested by Advocate General is based on certain 
assumptions which are far from evident. For instance, the assertion that the WTO 
Agreements have ‘virtually become a “constitutional” framework’,81 with the 
implications this may entail, expresses an ideal rather than a fact. Whilst there is a 
healthy debate about the constitutionalisation of the WTO rules,82 the assumption put 
forward in his Opinion is not borne out by the positions adopted by the contracting 
parties or the relevant rules. In any case, and the above notwithstanding, it by no 
means follows that the Court’s unlimited jurisdiction is the necessary corollary of his 
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assumption. The full integration of WTO rules within the Community legal order 
would not necessarily negate a multilevel system of interpretation and application.  
 
In fact, the position suggested by Advocate General Colomer appears to be linked to 
his suggestion that the Court reverses its case-law on the effects of the WTO law 
within the Community legal order. In the remainder of his Opinion, he attacks the 
denial of direct effect of WTO rules on various grounds, including its incompatibility 
with the principle pacta sunt servanda , its lack of subtlety in its approach to the 
margin of negotiation enjoyed by the Community institutions, its undue emphasis on 
the WTO system for settling disputes at the expense of the binding nature of the 
obligations undertaken by the Community, and a formalistic reading of the DSU 
provisions.83 Whilst he concludes that Article 33 TRIPs would not be directly 
effective, as its application is dependent on action by the national legislature, he 
advocates the reversal of the existing case-law on direct effect in principle.  
 
This approach is quite radical84 and at odds not only with earlier case-law, starting 
from the Portuguese Textiles judgment, but also more recent case law, such as the 
judgment in Van Parys, which reaffirmed the state of the law in quite emphatic 
terms.85 Following the judgment in Merck, the Court delivered its ruling in FIAMM86 
where it reaffirmed the principles of the preexisting case law with considerable force. 
It is beyond the scope of this analysis to examine this aspect of the Court’s approach 
to the effects of the WTO rules.87 Suffice it to point out that the analysis by Advocate 
General Colomer appears to bring together two issues which are not necessarily 
linked.  
 
VI. Conclusion: which Community interest?    
 
There is a thread which brings together the judgments analysed in this Chapter, 
namely the acknowledgment of the broad jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Viewed 
within the broader context of EC external relations law in general and mixed 
agreements in particular, this becomes one of the twin pillars aiming to ensure that the 
prevailing role of mixed agreements would not undermine what the Court calls ‘the 
Community interest’ - the other pillar is the duty of cooperation which binds the 
Community institutions and the Member States in the process of negotiation, 
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conclusion and implementation of mixed agreements and which has been given 
increased prominence in the law of EC external relations.88 The link between these 
principles underpins the judgments of the Court on the scope of its jurisdiction: in 
Dior and Others, and even more so in Schieving-Nijstad, a considerable role is carved 
out for national courts regarding the interpretation of TRIPs and substantiated 
pursuant to Article 10 EC and the function of the referring courts within the context of 
the preliminary reference procedure. Put differently, the broad construction of the 
duty of cooperation and its application to national courts too has as a corollary the 
broad construction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to interpret mixed 
agreements.    
 
However, the pillar of mixity to which the Court’s broad jurisdiction amounts is of a 
curious shape and uncertain foundation. Whilst broad, the jurisdiction of the Court 
remains ill-defined and questions as to which parameters are to constitute the basis for 
its definition persist. In this respect, two qualifications may be raised. First, the 
divergence of approach in the judgments examined in this Chapter may be explained 
in the light of the different contexts in which the relevant cases reached the Court. Put 
differently, it does not follow that the Community interest which the Court’s 
judgment aim to serve is identical in all the cases on the interpretation of mixed 
agreements brought before it.89 The judgments in Hermès, Dior and Others and 
Schieving-Nijstad, as well as that in Merck, were all rendered in response to 
preliminary references from domestic courts; this suggests that the ‘Community 
interest’90 in relation to the mixed agreement in question is defined in the light of the 
more general objective of the legal context within which it is pursued, namely that of 
uniform application of Community law.91 Furthermore, in all the above cases, with 
the exception of Merck, the provision of the mixed agreement whose interpretation 
was in issue was of a procedural nature which could apply in situations falling either 
within the scope of national or Community law. This was not the case in Merck where 
Article 33 TRIPs was not a procedural provision and would not apply to situations 
falling withint he scope of Community law. In a similar vein, the judgments in Berne 
Convention, Etang de Berre and Mox Plant were rendered in the context of the 
enforcement proceedings brought by the Commission and the Community interest 
was defined in terms of compliance with Community law.92 As Cremona points out, 
the existence of Community law in an area covered by a mixed agreement renders the 
participation of the Member States along with the Community in that agreement 
subject to the Member States’ loyalty obligation.93 
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Whilst different interests may be identified in the approach to different questions 
pursuant to different procedures, this does not fully explain the current state of affairs. 
On the one hand, the lack of clarity which defines the case-law in the area is also 
apparent in judgments which are delivered within the same context: in Dior and 
Others, for instance, the Court defines its jurisdiction in terms broader than those 
suggested earlier in Hermès. On the other hand, the two Community interests 
identified above, namely uniformity of application of mixed agreements and 
compliance with the latter’s provisions, may not be understood as entirely distinct. In 
fact, they both serve the same ultimate objective, namely the correct implementation 
of mixed agreements within the Community legal order. It is not immediately 
apparent, for instance, why the different legal contexts within which the judgments in 
Etang de Berre and Merck were rendered justified a broad construction of existing 
Community law in the former but not in the latter.   
 
A second qualification to an overall criticism of the Court’s position has to do with 
the following: it is not realistic to expect the Court to provide us with a crystal-clear 
tool the sharp edge of which would determine precisely in any given case where its 
jurisdiction would end. In relation to judgments delivered in response to preliminary 
references, the nature of the procedure set out in Article 234 EC and the function of 
the Court of Justice to respond to specific questions, and, more generally, the 
divergent nature of mixed agreements and their constant evolution, all suggest that 
complete clarity is illusionary. In the internal market law, the principle of 
proportionality in the area of free movement and the Keck rule in the context of 
Article 28 EC94 are only examples of how the Community legal order and its students 
have learnt to live with principles which determine the outcome of a number of cases 
without enabling us to predict their application with certainty.  
 
However, what traders, their legal counselors, and national judges do expect is a 
better reasoning in the judgments which are delivered and in the ways in which their 
specific questions are addressed. There ought to be a balance struck between 
addressing the specific issues raised before the Court and ensuring legal certainty. 
This Chapter suggested that the balance has yet to be struck correctly.  
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